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Since regime change disenfranchised the Sunni minority leader-
ship that had ruled Iraq since the country’s independence in 1932 and em-
powered the Shi‘a majority, the Shi‘a-Sunni competition for power has emerged
as the single greatest determinant of peace and stability in post-Saddam
Iraq. Iraq’s sectarian pains are all the more complex because reverberations
of Shi‘a empowerment will inevitably extend beyond Iraq’s borders, involv-
ing the broader region from Lebanon to Pakistan. The change in the sectar-
ian balance of power is likely to have a far more immediate and powerful
impact on politics in the greater Middle East than any potential example of
a moderate and progressive government in Baghdad. The change in the sec-
tarian balance of power will shape public perception of U.S. policies in Iraq
as well as the long-standing balance of power between the Shi‘a and Sunnis
that sets the foundation of politics from Lebanon to Pakistan. U.S. interests
in the greater Middle East are now closely tied to the risks and opportunities
that will emanate from the Shi‘a revival in Iraq.
The competition for power between the Shi‘a and Sunnis is neither a new
development nor one limited to Iraq. In fact, it has shaped alliances and de-
termined how various actors have defined and pursued their interests in the
region for the past three decades. Often overlooked in political analyses of
greater Middle Eastern politics, this competition is key to grasping how cur-
rent developments in Iraq will shape this region in years to come. Sectarian-
ism during this time period has also been closely tied to the development of
militant Islamist ideology and activism among Sunnis. Sunni identity is part
and parcel of the ideology and politics of jihadi groups associated with Al
Qaeda; the Taliban; militant Wahhabis, a puritanical sectarian movement
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that emerged in the eighteenth century in modern Saudi Arabia; and the
various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni Islamist organization
that appeared in Egypt in the 1920s and is associated with the rise of politi-
cal Islam, especially in the Arab world. Anti-Shi‘a violence is not just a stra-
tegic ploy used by Al Qaeda operatives, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to
create instability in Iraq and undermine Washington’s plans for that country’s
future; it is a constituent part of the ideology of Sunni militancy.
The anti-Shi‘a violence that plagues Iraq
today was first born in South Asia and Af-
ghanistan in the 1990s by militant groups
with ties to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In
the past nine months, bombings in Baghdad,
Iskandariya, Karbala, Najaf, and other Shi‘a
strongholds in Iraq have claimed many lives.
In early March 2004, some 143 worshippers
were killed at the site of the holiest Shi‘a
shrine in Baghdad and Karbala, during the
celebration of Ashura, the holiest day on the
Shi‘a calendar. These attacks closely resemble acts in Mashad, Karachi,
Quetta, and Mazar-i Sharif since the early 1990s. The current sectarian
threat in Iraq is therefore more the product of a deeply rooted rivalry in the
region than the direct result of recent developments in Iraq. In other words,
the Shi‘a revival and the decline in Sunni power in Iraq has not created
Sunni militancy; it has invigorated and emboldened it. The ascendance of
Sunni militancy is at the forefront of anti-Americanism in Iraq today and, as
such, is likely to spread anti-Americanism in tandem with sectarian tensions
throughout the greater Middle East region. On the day of the early March
Ashura bombings, a Kuwaiti Wahhabi cleric condemned the Shi‘a rite on his
web site as “the biggest display of idolatry” and accused the Shi‘a of forming
an “evil axis linking Washington, Tel Aviv, and the Shi‘a holy city of Najaf”
to grab Persian Gulf oil and disenfranchise Sunnis.1
Beyond Iraq, U.S. interests and objectives in the greater Middle East are
ineluctably tied to the ebbs and flows of Shi‘a-Sunni struggles for power.
Policymaking must reflect this reality, both by responding to the threat posed
by the broader Sunni reaction to Shi‘a revival in Iraq and by exploiting the
opportunities that the growing Shi‘a power in the region presents. Unless
policymakers recognize the importance of the sectarian dimension of regional
politics and understand how changes in Iraq impact the broader region, U.S.
policy will miss the mark. Sectarian tensions can produce unpalatable futures
for U.S. relations with the region, confounding goals of peace, stability, and
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The Regional Shi‘a Legacy
The Shi‘a number around 130 million people globally, some 10 percent of
the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims. The overwhelming majority of Shi‘a (ap-
proximately 120 million) live in the area between Lebanon and Pakistan, where
they constitute the majority population in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan;
the single-largest community in Lebanon; and sizeable minorities in various
Gulf emirates, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (as well as in neigh-
boring countries such as India and Tajikistan and in East Africa).2  In the arc
stretching from Pakistan to Lebanon, the number of Shi‘a matches that of
Sunnis; in the Gulf region, the Shi‘a clearly predominate.
Still, sheer numbers have not guaranteed the region’s Shi‘a a commensu-
rate political voice. Outside of Iran, Sunnism has long been the face of the
greater Middle East, particularly in defining the Arab political culture. From
the marshes of southern Iraq to the ghettoes of Karachi, the Shi‘a have been
the underdogs—oppressed and marginalized by Sunni ruling regimes and
majority communities. The Iranian revolution of 1979 initially mobilized the
Shi‘a identity and emboldened the Shi‘a masses to follow the Iranian lead,
flexing their muscles and asserting their rights elsewhere in the region.3  The
Iranian revolution not only showed the Shi‘a a path to power but also pro-
vided powerful financial, moral, and organizational support in the Shi‘a
struggles for rights and representation.
Whereas throughout the 1960s and 1970s the Shi‘a had championed secu-
lar nationalist causes and looked to Pan-Arabism or leftist ideologies to
bridge the sectarian divide and include them in the political mainstream,4
in the 1980s many joined the ranks of distinctly Shi‘a political movements.
Groups such as Amal in Lebanon, al-Da’waa al-Islamiya (the Islamic Call)
in Iraq, Hizb-i Wahdat (Party of Unity) in Afghanistan, and Tahrik-i Jafaria
(Shi‘a Movement) in Pakistan received financial and political support from
Tehran to push for specifically Shi‘a agendas. For example, with Tehran’s
blessing, Pakistani Shi‘a rejected their government’s much-publicized Is-
lamic laws of 1979 as “Sunni” and were able to gain exemption from the
laws, which led many more Pakistanis to declare themselves Shi‘a.5  Iran’s
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini actively supported Pakistani Shi‘a demands,
openly threatening Pakistan’s Gen. Zia ul-Haq that, if his military regime
“mistreated [the Shi‘a, Khomeini] would deal with Zia as he had dealt with
the Shah.”6  In India, after continued disturbances between the Shi‘a and
Sunnis in Lucknow beginning in the late 1980s, the Shi‘a community sided
with the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in provincial and
national elections in the 1990s, breaking with the larger Muslim community
to protect its own specific interests.
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Iran’s sectarian posturing was not limited to mobilizing Shi‘a minorities.
Khomeini issued a ruling (fatwa) declaring the ruling Alawi sect in Syria,
which is an offshoot of Shi‘ism and viewed by the majority of Sunnis and the
Shi‘a as not Islamic, to be within the pale of Islam. The fatwa gave the re-
gime of Alawi Hafiz al-Asad, whose base of power rested in Syria’s minority
Alawi community, legitimacy at a time when it was under pressure by the
Muslim Brotherhood. More significantly, Tehran refused to support the Mus-
lim Brotherhood when Asad’s regime brutally suppressed the group’s upris-
ing in the city of Hama in 1982. The Tehran-Damascus axis was part of
Iran’s Shi‘a expansionist agenda. It provided Iran with a counterbalance to
the regional Sunni Arab alliance that supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War.
Syria supported Iran in the war diplomatically as well as by applying military
pressure on Baghdad, maintaining large numbers of troops along its border
with Iraq. The alliance also enabled Iran to establish Hizballah in Lebanon,
supporting the organization throughout the 1980s and 1990s to confront the
U.S. presence in Lebanon and entrench Iranian influence among Lebanese
Shi‘a.
Despite these early gains, the Iranian revolution only briefly threatened
Sunni dominance in the region. It did more to cast Shi‘ism as a revolution-
ary anti-Western force at the center of the resurgent politics of Islam than as
the vehicle for the empowerment of Shi‘a communities. Revolutionary Iran
failed to alter the balance of power between the Shi‘a and Sunnis across the
region and ultimately gave up trying to do so. By the end of the 1980s, with
the exception of Hizballah in Lebanon, all other Iranian-backed Shi‘a politi-
cal drives for power in the Gulf, Afghanistan, and Pakistan had come to
naught, while Iran’s military drive to unseat Saddam Hussein’s regime had
ended in defeat. Sunni domination of the region had survived the challenge
of the Iranian revolution.
The Sunni Backlash
The rise of Sunni consciousness and its sectarian posturing after the Iranian
revolution was central to containing Khomeini’s threat in the greater Middle
East and beyond. Sunni identity served as the bulwark against the Islamist
challenge that was then associated with Shi‘a Iran and imbued ruling re-
gimes with religious legitimacy. Since the 1980s, governments from Nigeria
to Indonesia and Malaysia have relied on Sunni identity to draw a clear
wedge between Sunni and Shi‘a Islam, equating the former with “true” Is-
lam—and their governments as its defenders—and branding the latter as
obscurantist extremism. They dismissed Khomeini as Shi‘a rather than an
Islamic leader, and characterized their own Islamic opponents as Shi‘a to re-
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duce their appeal. In 1998 the government of Gen. Sani Abacha in Nigeria
accused the Muslim Brotherhood leader, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Zak Zaki, of be-
ing a Shi‘a before his trial for antigovernment activism. In Malaysia, the
government has routinely arrested Islamic activists under the pretext that
they are Shi‘a, thus avoiding the appearance to its domestic audience of
clamping down on Islamic activism while appearing to be protecting Sunnism
from “nefarious anti-Sunni” activities.
In India and Pakistan, Sunni ulama (clerical
leaders) took Khomeini head on, branding his
vitriol against the House of Saud in the 1980s
as fitna (illegitimate rebellion and sowing of
disunity) against the Muslim community.7
Khomeini’s challenge to the Saudi regime was
depicted as a Shi‘a rebellion against Sunni au-
thority, evoking the legacy of Shi‘a rebellions
against the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates in
early Islamic history that had ensured Sunni domination of centers of reli-
gious and political power in the Muslim world. This mobilized much sup-
port for King Fahd ibn Abdulaziz’s arrogation of the religiously and
historically significant title of Protector of Holy Sites, Mecca and Medina
(which are located in Saudi Arabia). As such, the Saudis became the de-
fenders of Sunnism and the symbol of its resistance to Shi‘a “usurpers.”
Saudi Arabia was motivated by the desire both to control its own Shi‘a mi-
nority and to thwart Khomeini’s challenge to the Islamic legitimacy of the
kingdom. The Shi‘a-Sunni struggles for the soul of Islam that had punctu-
ated Islamic history since the advent of the faith were thus reenacted in
the late twentieth century, with the Saudi monarchy assuming the role
once played by Sunni caliphs ruling from Damascus and Baghdad.
In Pakistan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, where emboldened
Shi‘a communities threatened Sunni regimes, the response was both swifter
and more violent. Rulers ranging from Zia in Pakistan to Saddam in Iraq not
only emphasized the Sunni identity of their countries and regimes as a bul-
wark against Khomeini’s appeal but also sanctioned the use of sectarian vio-
lence to put local Shi‘a communities back in their place. To this effect,
Saddam in 1980 began purges of government agencies, the military, and the
Ba‘th party, which combined with executions, assassinations, and mass kill-
ings that in 1991 alone took the lives of some 30,000 subdued Iraqi Shi‘a.8
In Pakistan, the cycle of bombings and assassinations that resulted from
Sunni-Shi‘a clashes throughout the 1980s and the 1990s scarred both com-
munities.9  Some 900 incidents of street clashes and sectarian riots since
1989 have claimed more than 2,000 lives. Over five days in northwest Paki-
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stan in 1996, sectarian combatants used mortars, rocket launchers, and an-
tiaircraft missiles, killing about 200 people. Between January and May 1997,10
Sunni militant groups assassinated 75 Shi‘a community leaders in an at-
tempt to remove the Shi‘a systematically from positions of authority.11  Until
September 11, 2001, the Pakistani military actively supported Sunni mili-
tancy as a part of its regional policy in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Support for
the militants continued after the attacks, only more circumspectly as
Pakistan’s military tried to protect its position in southern Afghanistan and
Kashmir just as it sought to placate the international demand for ending
jihadi activism. Azam Tariq, the leader of Sipah-i Sahabah Pakistan (Pakistan’s
Army of Companions of the Prophet), one of the most violent anti-Shi‘a
sectarian forces in the country with ties to the Taliban and Al Qaeda, was
President Gen. Pervez Musharraf ’s most prominent Islamist ally until Tariq
was assassinated in 2003.
Shi‘a attempts to attain greater power in South Asia eventually failed.
Sectarian forces tied to the Pakistani military and equipped with fatwas from
Wahhabi ulama in Saudi Arabia and their allies in Afghanistan, India, and
Pakistan engaged in systematic bombing of Shi‘a mosques and assassination
of Shi‘a community leaders, government officials, and religious figures, espe-
cially in Pakistan throughout the 1990s. In the latest incident in March
2004, 43 Shi‘a were killed in Quetta while commemorating Ashura on the
same day as 143 Shi‘a died in Baghdad and Karbala. The Taliban, whose
ideas were shaped in seminaries that received funding from Saudi Arabia,
reflected Wahhabi views; and trained Pakistani Sunni militants followed a
similar policy in Afghanistan, massacring the Shi‘a in Mazar-i Sharif in 1997
and in Bamiyan in 1998 and forcing thousands of others to migrate to Iran
and Pakistan. After the Taliban captured Mazar-i Sharif in 1997, they de-
clared that the Shi‘a were not Muslims and not welcome. They gave the
Shi‘a the options of converting to Sunnism; emigrating to Iran; or, as was
the fate of some 2,000, death.12
Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism
The Sunni assault on Shi‘ism is directly supported by Saudi Arabia,
Wahhabism, and the network of terror that Wahhabism has spawned, espe-
cially in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Wahhabism is a puritanical school of
Sunnism that upholds a strident and narrow interpretation of Islam, viewing
all those who do not subscribe to its views, and especially the Shi‘a, as infi-
dels. Since the 1970s, when Saudi Arabia benefited from the rise in the
price of oil, Wahhabi religious leaders have exported their views of Islam by
supporting various Islamic organizations and activities across the Muslim
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world. Their influence became particularly prominent in South Asia as Saudi
funding supported the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation of Afghani-
stan, which produced the infrastructure for the network of Sunni militants
that has been active in Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Pakistani jihadi groups.
In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Deobandi school of Sunni Islam, whose
madrasas have been the training ground for Al Qaeda, Taliban, and the rank
and file of militant organizations in Pakistan and Kashmir, has become the
main vehicle to disseminate anti-Shi‘a Wahhabi views. Militantly anti-Shi‘a
sectarian militias in Pakistan such as the Sipah-i Sahabah and Lashkar-i
Jhangvi (Jhangvi’s Army) hail from Deobandi
madrasas and maintain close ties with the
Taliban and terrorist organizations such as
Jaiesh-i Muhammad (Army of Muhammad)
and Harakat ul-Mujahedin (Movement of
Mujahedin) that are active in Kashmir and
are responsible for acts of terror such as the
murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel
Pearl. Sipah and Lashkar members trained in
Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Lashkar’s
founder, Riaz Basra, boasted of having been a
close companion of Osama Bin Laden.13  Ahmad Ramzi Yusuf, the master-
mind behind the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, is alleged
to have carried out the bombing of one of Shi‘ism’s holist shrines in Mashad,
Iran, in 1994.14
Sunni militants in South Asia are products of the same training grounds
in Afghanistan as Al Qaeda’s Arab foot soldiers. Organizational as well
as ideological ties spawned from the Wahhabi core bind the sectarian
forces with the Sunni Arab terrorists. Anti-Shi‘a sectarianism is an im-
portant dimension of the Taliban’s and Al Qaeda’s political objective,
one that their war on the West has largely overshadowed. Pakistani
Sunni, Taliban, and Al Qaeda combatants fought together in military
campaigns in Afghanistan, most notably in the capture of Mazar-i Sharif
and Bamiyan in 1997, which involved the wide-scale massacre of the
Shi‘a. Pakistani Sipah-i Sahabah fighters did most of the killing, nearly
precipitating a war with Iran when they captured the Iranian consulate
and killed 11 Iranian diplomats.15  Sectarian Sunni fighters in Iraq will
draw on the ideological and organizational resources of the broader net-
work of Sunni militancy that developed over the past decade and has
been ensconced in society and politics in the greater Middle East, im-
pacting sectarian relations where those resources originate, in Afghani-
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Wahhabism emerged in the Arabian Peninsula in the eighteenth century
and is today the dominant faith in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf littoral emir-
ates. Its opprobrium for Shi‘ism is as old as the school itself. Wahhabi armies
invaded southern Iraq and desecrated the Shi‘a holy shrine of Karbala in
1801. Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, Wahhabi ulama issued fatwas
declaring the Shi‘a as rafidis (those who reject the truth of Islam), or infi-
dels. Muslim Brotherhood activists in the Arab world and Deobandi ulama
in India and Pakistan who are close to Wahhabi groups in Saudi Arabia have
reiterated these opinions, justifying violence against the Shi‘a. The Taliban
too echoed the same opinions, characterizing
their massacre of the Shi‘a in Mazar-i Sharif in
1997 as the “revenge of Truth.”16
Wahhabi opposition to Shi‘ism converged
with Saudi Arabia’s regional policy of contain-
ing Iran starting in 1980. For the next two de-
cades, Riyadh and its Sunni clients characterized
Khomeini’s challenge to the House of Saud as a
Shi‘a assault on Sunnism. In this sectarian con-
frontation, Sunni loyalties rested with Riyadh.
Hence, entrenching anti-Shi‘a sentiments and
reinforcing Sunni identity in the region became imperative for the kingdom.
Riyadh supported Saddam’s regime all the way up to Iraq’s invasion of Ku-
wait in 1990. Even after the liberation of Kuwait, Riyadh was instrumental
in convincing Washington to back away from its promises of support to the
1991 Shi‘a uprising against Saddam’s regime in southern Iraq and in per-
suading Washington to defend Sunni domination in Baghdad. In Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia helped restore the Sunni position to the center, through the
government of Rafiq Hariri, and has been strongly defending the Sunni es-
tablishment in Beirut ever since.
Elsewhere, Saudi Arabia pursued its strategy of containing Shi‘ism by
working closely with Wahhabi ulama to build a network of seminaries, mosques,
educational institutions, preachers, activists, writers, journalists, and aca-
demics that would articulate and emphasize Sunni identity, push that iden-
tity throughout the greater Middle East in the direction of Wahhabism and
militancy, draw a clear wedge between Sunni and Shi‘a Islam, and eliminate
Iran’s ideological influence. As one observer remarked of the pattern of
funding for militant Sunni madrasas in Pakistan in the 1980s, “If you look at
where the most madrasas were constructed, you will realize that they form a
wall blocking Iran off from Pakistan.”17
Saudi Arabia’s aim here is to stretch that Sunni wall from Pakistan north
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funding of mosques and religious organizations and programs is strengthen-
ing Sunni consciousness in a society wherein sectarian identities were
largely absent in the past and are now on the rise. The Saudi regime’s sup-
port for Islamic activism throughout the 1980s and 1990s had distinctly
Sunni sectarian overtones. The spread of radical Islam in Central Asia and
the Caucasus in the 1990s did not come through Iran but through the Saudi
policy of containing Iran; it was not so much an Islamic project as it was a
Sunni one. As such, Sunni militancy across the region is not likely to remain
impervious to change in the sectarian balance in Iraq.
Riyadh’s investment in Sunni militancy did not raise much concern in the
West in the 1980s and the 1990s, for during this period Iran and its brand of
Shi‘a militancy were viewed as the most dangerous face of Islam and the
main threat to Western interests. The hostage crisis in Iran in 1979, the
bombing of U.S. Marines and French military
barracks in Lebanon in 1983, the taking of U.S.
and European hostages in that country through-
out the 1980s, and Iran’s support for anti-West-
ern causes and terrorism throughout the 1980s
and much of the 1990s focused Western atten-
tion on Iran and Shi‘a militancy. The Shi‘a were
then associated with anti-Americanism, revolu-
tion, terrorism, hostage taking, and suicide bomb-
ing. The Shi‘a political fervor that emanated from
Tehran and the kind of violence that it perpe-
trated was seen as an extension of the faith’s millenarian beliefs and celebra-
tion of martyrdom.
By comparison, Sunni Islamic activists appeared less threatening. The
West viewed them as socially and politically conservative but lacking in re-
ligious doctrines that matched the Shi‘a penchant for militancy. Throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, the West was thus more tolerant of Sunni activism in
general as well as the movement’s spread into Afghanistan under the Taliban
and across Central Asia.
After Khomeini’s death in 1988, Shi‘a militancy ceased to be the ideo-
logical force that animated Islamic activism. Instead, Sunni militancy as-
sumed that role following the 1991 Gulf War that brought the United States
into direct conflict with an Arab country and established a U.S. military
presence in the region, particularly in Saudi Arabia in close proximity to
Muslim holy sites Mecca and Medina. Determined to suppress the threat to
Western interests apparently posed by the spread of Shi‘ism following the
Iranian revolution, the West was slow to recognize the change in the Islamic
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though initially established to contain Shi‘a activism, had begun to turn its
antipathy toward the West.
Although it took the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the prolific use
of suicide bombing by Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Israel to alert the West to
the threat posed by Sunni militancy, it has in fact been on the rise through-
out the region for the past two decades, at least partially if not primarily as a
response to the Shi‘a activism that followed the Iranian revolution. At that
time, Sunni militancy emerged to maintain the balance of power in favor of
Sunnis in the region, but Saddam’s fall has now radically changed that bal-
ance. The occupation of Iraq went hand in hand with a Shi‘a cultural re-
vival in that country. The celebration of Arbaeen (the commemoration of
the 40th day after martyrdom of the Shi‘a Imam Husayn [d. 680]) in Karbala
in May 2003 by some two million Shi‘a early on attested to the fact that Iraq
was now a Shi‘a country. The growing prominence of the Shi‘a in Iraq, vis-
ible in the composition of the Iraqi Governing Council and later confirmed
by the veto power that Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has attained over its pro-
ceedings, has only further underscored this sea change.
The Challenge of a Shi‘a Iraq
Ever since the United States removed Saddam from power, the Grand Ayatol-
lah al-Sistani has consistently pressed the United States to embrace an elec-
toral process that will ensure the Shi‘a control of Iraq for the first time since
the Sunni Ottoman Empire seized Baghdad in 1533. Although Iraq’s Shi‘a do
not speak with one voice, Shi‘a politics, culture, and religious values, more
than those of Iraq’s Sunni and Kurdish populations, will shape Iraq’s future.
Iraq will be the first Arab country to become openly Shi‘a. Of all Arab
countries, Iraq is one of the most important—a claimant to the mantle of
Arab leadership and the seat of the Abbasid Empire (750–1258), which
established and embodied Sunni supremacy and brutally suppressed the
Shi‘a (many of whose main figures were killed by the Abbasids in and around
Baghdad and are now buried in the shrines of Iraq). To pass from Sunni to
Shi‘a domination under the aegis of the United States has immense sym-
bolic significance.
After the fall of the Abbasids, the land that constitutes modern Iraq
changed hands among various invaders and Muslim imperial contenders and
was for a while a province of the Persian Safavid Empire. In 1533, Ottoman
armies defeated the Safavids to capture Baghdad and restore Sunni rule
over the area. The Ottoman conquest was a markedly sectarian affair in that
the Sunni Ottomans and Shi‘a Safavids each claimed to represent the world
of Islam.18  Religious persecution therefore followed military victory. The Ot-
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toman victory ushered in a lengthy period of political domination by Sunnis
that continued all the way through the Sharifian monarchy (1921–1958)
and the Arab nationalist and Ba‘thist periods that followed. Sunni domina-
tion in this era too reflected the longer history of suppression of Shi‘ism,
curtailing its cultural expression and denying its followers political power
and, in turn, rejecting Shi‘ism’s religious legitimacy.
The domination of Shi‘a politics in Iraq today by the ulama means that
Shi‘a revival in the country will inevitably
change the country’s culture and the place of
religion in it, which will then profoundly im-
pact relations between the Shi‘a and Sunnis
within Iraq as well as in the region as a whole.19
For instance, Shi‘a law and theology are likely
to define the extent to which Islam will play a
role in Iraq’s politics, potentially compelling
Sunnis to live by Shi‘a law. The implementa-
tion of Shi‘a Islamic laws regarding family,
taxes, inheritance, or commerce will be welcomed by the Shi‘a and not by
Sunnis, underscoring rather than erasing sectarian identities.
Based on the current distribution of power within Iraq’s Governing Council
as well as in the Shi‘a community, there is speculation that an ayatollah may be
the country’s future president. Currently, the main contender is Ayatollah
Abdulaziz al-Hakim, the head of one of the main Shi‘a political organizations,
the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).20  The prospect of
an ayatollah ruling Iraq raises the specter of a Shi‘a Islamic Republic in Iraq
similar to the one in Iran; more importantly, however, are the implications of
such an outcome for sectarian conflict. For the Sunnis of Iraq and those in its
neighboring Arab countries, SCIRI and its al-Badr Brigade—a force of some
10,000 that was trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards to fight the Saddam re-
gime—look too much like Lebanese Shi‘a militias, Amal and Hizballah, and
prospects of their assumption of power evoke images of Lebanon’s grueling civil
war. The recent show of force by the more militant Army of the Mahdi militia of
Muqtada al-Sadr has only reinforced these concerns. The car bomb that assas-
sinated Iraqi Shi‘a leader Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim and took the
lives of another 125 Shi‘a outside one of Shi‘ism’s holiest shrines in late August
2003, and the bombings in Karbala and Baghdad on March 2004, marked not
only blows to Iraq’s stability and security but also the opening salvos in a re-
vived sectarian conflict with broader regional implications. The impact of these
events will not be erased easily by the tactical alliance between the Shi‘a and
Sunnis in opposing U.S. occupation. The sectarian divide may be bridged to
combat the United States, but it is likely to resurface after the occupation.
The Shi‘a revival in
Iraq may well lead to
other regime changes
in the region.
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Regional Implications
The Shi‘a cultural revival in Iraq has broad implications not only for the
future political development of Iraq but also for future sectarian develop-
ments in the greater Middle East, tipping the balance of power in favor of
the Shi‘a. The cultural and religious ties that bind Shi‘a populations from
Lebanon to Pakistan are once again of political significance; after two de-
cades of suppression at the hands of Sunni regimes, the Shi‘a are again de-
manding greater rights and their place in the political arena. In Saudi
Arabia, Shi‘a political activism, brutally suppressed since 1979, is on the
rise; and organizations such as the Saudi Hizballah, the Tajammu‘ al-Ulama
al-Hijaz (The Hijazi Ulama Group), and al-Haraka al-Islahiyah (the Re-
form Movement) are demanding political and religious rights for the Shi‘a
from the monarchy.21
Organizational and religious ties between Shi‘a seminaries in Iran and in
Iraq are only the most evident link in the network of ayatollahs and their
representatives, organizations, and seminaries stretching from Lucknow, In-
dia, to Zanzibar, Tanzania, to Dearborn, Michigan. The opening of Iraq and
gradual changes in Iran will strengthen the linkages centered in Qum and
Najaf, as the winds of change in the region promised by the campaign in
Iraq more tightly connect disparate Shi‘a communities and their institu-
tions. The triumphal trip of Iran’s President Mohammad Khatami to Leba-
non shortly after the fall of Baghdad was designed to underscore the
importance of these ties, which also became evident with the presence of
some 100,000 Iranian pilgrims in Karbala for the early March Ashura com-
memoration. Also a clear signal of the growing prominence of Shi‘ism
throughout the Middle East after regime change in Iraq was the convention
of Saudi ulama that Crown Prince Abdullah called in the summer of 2003 to
search for common ground between the Wahhabi and Shi‘a religious leaders
in the kingdom. In the coming years, less encumbered by the rigid bound-
aries of nationalisms, ideologies, and authoritarian regimes, Shi‘ism is likely
to have the opportunity—more than ever before in recent history—to once
again become a regional force.
Implications for U.S. Regional Interests
In militant Sunni circles, the Shi‘a revival in Iraq is proof of “sinister” U.S.
intentions toward Islam after the events of September 11, 2001—the
grand conspiracy to weaken and subjugate the faith. To these circles,
Washington has snatched Iraq from the hands of “true” Islam and deliv-
ered it to Shi‘a rafidis. Sectarian feelings constitute an important dimen-
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sion, and one to which the United States has not paid adequate attention,
of the reaction in the Arab world and beyond to the U.S. occupation of
Iraq, especially among the burgeoning militant Sunni forces that are grow-
ing in prominence as the expression of Sunni frustration with the decline
in Sunni power.
Moreover, sectarianism’s anti-Shi‘a and anti-U.S. rhetoric is central to per-
ceptions of U.S. policy in the Muslim world, especially in Arab countries
where the impact of the U.S. presence in Iraq
is more clearly felt. The Middle East historian,
Michael Scott Doran, writes that Wahhabi
ulama in Saudi Arabia continue to issue
fatwas or give sermons denouncing Shi‘a be-
liefs and practices as heresy but now tie the
opprobrium for Shi‘ism to anti-Americanism.
The Shi‘a are portrayed as a “fifth column for
the enemies of true Islam. … The danger of
the [Shi‘a] heretics to the region … is not less
than the danger of the Jews and Christians.”22
The war in Iraq has been viewed as proof of “the strength of the bond be-
tween America and the [Shi‘a] heretics.”23  The language of Wahhabi ulama
in Saudi Arabia echoes the anti-Shi‘a vitriol of the Taliban in Afghanistan and
militant Sunni forces in Pakistan, as do threats to annihilate the Shi‘a minor-
ity in the Saudi kingdom.
The Shi‘a revival in Iraq also jeopardizes U.S. interests in Saudi Arabian
stability. As Riyadh can no longer claim to be sustaining Sunni dominance in
the Middle East, it is witnessing a decline in its religious legitimacy within
the kingdom as well as across the region. Instead, Al Qaeda and the Iraqi re-
sistance are now making that claim. The Saudi monarchy cannot easily pos-
ture as defender of the Sunni prerogative to power in the region without
directly supporting forces that resist the U.S. role in Iraq. The Shi‘a revival in
Iraq, as it alters the balance of power between Sunnis and the Shi‘a and fuels
demands for Shi‘a rights at the same time as it fuels Sunni frustration and ac-
tivism, more than any attainment of democracy and prosperity, may well lead
to other regime changes in the region.
The United States walks a thin line in dealing with the sectarian dimension
of its occupation of Iraq and must be mindful that this issue extends far be-
yond Iraqi politics. Today, Sunni militancy and Wahhabi activism, not Shi‘a
revolutionary fervor, pose the greatest danger to U.S. interests. In places such
as Azerbaijan, where there are both Shi‘a and Sunnis, it is Sunni Islamism, not
Shi‘a, that mobilizes youth toward political activism. Today, Sunni militancy is
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virulently anti-American. From Bali to Baghdad, it is producing networks of
activists that sustain the most dangerous forms of terrorism. Al Qaeda cap-
tures the ideological and political essence of Sunni militancy, but this move-
ment extends far beyond Al Qaeda. Shi‘a revolutionary activism, on the other
hand, is essentially a spent force. Iran is currently a tired dictatorship teeter-
ing on the verge of collapse. The ideas emerging from modern-day Iran, simi-
lar to those that characterized the end of the
Soviet era, do not support revolutionary fervor
but rather demand liberal change.
Sunni militancy has since inception been anti-
American and has produced the most violent ex-
pressions of this position in the form of Al Qaeda.
Today, as evidenced by the rhetoric of the Wahhabi
ulama and militants such as al-Zarqawi, Sunni mili-
tancy is a two-pronged effort: to extricate U.S.
influence from the greater Middle East and to
restore Sunni dominance to it. These aims are in-
terrelated for, just as the United States facilitated the empowerment of the
Shi‘a by dismantling the Sunni dictatorship in Iraq, only defeating the
United States in Iraq can reverse the gains made by the Shi‘a in that coun-
try and the region more broadly. In his letter al-Zarqawi referred to the Shi‘a
as “the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious
scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom.” He added that, “We
here [in Iraq] are entering a battle on two levels. One, evident and open, is
with an attacking enemy and patent infidelity.”24 In his most recent audio-
tape, released amidst U.S. operations in Faluja and against Army of the
Mahdi, al-Zarqawi reiterated his vitriol against Shi‘ism with threats against
U.S. forces.25 The bombings in Karbala, Najaf, and other Shi‘a holy sites
make clear that Sunni militancy is designed both to combat the Shi‘a revival
and provoke a sectarian civil war in Iraq to confound U.S. plans for the coun-
try. It is for this reason that Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani parted with Muqtada al-Sadr’s claim of Shi‘a-Sunni unity in
opposing the U.S. occupation to praise Army of the Mahdi’s insurrection
in southern Iraq as heroic and call the insurgents in Faluja terrorists.26
Policy Implications: Contending with Sectarianism
At face value, Shi‘a populations in the Middle East and South Asia would
appear to be the natural allies of the United States in the effort to contain
Sunni militancy. Still, the United States cannot openly embrace the Shi‘a
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more anti-Shi‘a Wahhabi states of the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf such
as Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, where the United States
now has considerable strategic interests. Nor are the Shi‘a ready to embrace
the United States as their savior or ally. Powerful Shi‘a forces in Iraq today,
such as that of Muqtada al-Sadr, are aligning themselves against the United
States. Washington’s lack of relations with other important Shi‘a forces in
the region, such as the Islamic Republic in Iran and Hizballah in Lebanon,
further complicates prospects for a U.S.-Shi‘a nexus.
The sectarian struggle for power will not end in Iraq, and the United
States cannot easily sidestep this ongoing conflict, given its long-standing
alliance with Saudi Arabia and more recently its role in facilitating Shi‘a
empowerment in Iraq. Policymakers in Washington must take the sectarian
struggle for power between the Shi‘a and Sunnis seriously to avoid civil
strife in Iraq and the rise of Sunni militancy as a new regional threat. Suc-
cessful U.S. policy in Iraq and in the greater Middle East ultimately will
have to be based on a strategy that incorporates the following elements:
• Recognize that the Shi‘a-Sunni balance of power is key to regional stability and
U.S. regional interests. The sectarian struggle for power will have the single
greatest influence on the future of peace and stability from South Asia to
the Levant—an area that ties Central Asia to the Caucasus to the Gulf,
significantly impacting U.S. regional interests as well as U.S. efforts to
promote democracy and economic growth. The changing balance of
power between the Shi‘a and Sunnis will be central to the political out-
come not only in Iraq but also in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Azerbaijan, and Saudi Arabia. Developments in Iraq will likely only ac-
centuate this trend in the coming years.
U.S. policy must go beyond the imperatives of the war on terrorism
and the existing structure of alliances to reflect the Shi‘a-Sunni dimen-
sion of regional politics. Accordingly, the United States must develop a
broader policy framework that recognizes the interconnectedness of its
relations with Iran and Lebanon to its interests in Iraq, the Gulf, and
South Asia and harnesses  the growing regional  power of  Shi‘ism.
Such a policy framework will bring coherence to U.S. policy toward Iraq
and the greater Middle East and ensure regional stability at a time when
the war in Iraq has disturbed the long-standing political balance in the
region.
• Avoid confrontation with Iraq’s Shi‘a and, most importantly, al-Sistani. Al-
Sistani’s demand for direct elections risks further marginalizing Sunnis and
compromising the future of secular government in Iraq. Nevertheless,
alienating the Shi‘a, especially their most prominent and moderate voice,
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bears yet greater risk. As the most widely followed cleric, al-Sistani holds
the key to stability in Shi‘a communities in Iraq and elsewhere in the
greater Middle East. To continue to have a moderating influence on the
Shi‘a, to keep al-Sadr and his anti-Americanism at bay, and to prevent the
Shi‘a from responding to provocations by Sunni militants, as happened in
Quetta, Pakistan, after the Sunni militant attack on the Shi‘a in early
March 2004,27  al-Sistani has to retain his political legitimacy. This means
that al-Sistani must deliver on Shi‘a demands for greater political power
and not be seen as doing the bidding of the United States.
• Recognize that Shi‘a-dominated countries of Iran and Iraq are better positioned
to achieve economic growth and democracy than their Sunni neighbors. Iran
and Iraq are more likely to achieve these objectives than neighboring
Sunni countries (with the exception of Turkey). The dictatorship’s hold
in each has been broken, which has allowed for democratic possibilities in
Iraq while civil society has moved past ideological politics in Iran. In both
countries, Shi‘ism no longer produces the kind of ideological politics that
Sunnism continues to generate.
In Iraq, the Shi‘a who have benefited from the fall of Saddam’s regime and
are likely to inherit the political order from the U.S. authority are more
likely to react positively to democracy than the Sunnis whose politics are in-
creasingly defined by their rejection of the U.S.-imposed order in Iraq.
Moreover, the most thorough and lively debates about the place of Islam in
the modern world including its relation to democracy and economic growth
are taking place among Shi‘a Muslims (with the exception of Turkey), not
Sunnis. The Shi‘a countries, whose politics are no longer dominated by au-
thoritarian ideologies (Islamism in Iran and Arab nationalism in Iraq), are
likely to emerge as the first to embrace democracy and integration into the
world economy and also to play a key role in bringing about change in the
Muslim world. For all the current fear of emerging Shi‘a dominance in Iraq
among U.S. policymakers, the reality that must be recognized is that this
process will produce a convergence of interests between the United States
and Shi‘ism sooner than it will between the United States and Sunni coun-
tries. U.S. policymakers should look to expedite positive changes in the
Shi‘a countries as a part of the faith’s greater regional prominence.
As Shi‘ism grows in prominence in Iraq as well as across the greater Middle
East, Sunni militancy spearheaded by Al Qaeda, Iraqi resistance, Hamas,
and the rump of the Taliban is also on the rise. It has the potential to trans-
form into an even greater force if the Wahhabi oppositional movement in
Saudi Arabia succeeds in changing the political landscape of that country.
Simultaneously at war with the United States and Shi‘ism, Sunni militancy
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will embroil the region in sectarian violence as it seeks to reject both the
U.S. order and changes that the growing prominence of Shi‘ism will entail.
The challenge of Sunni militancy coupled with the promise for change
brought about by the reemergence of Shi‘a political influence in the greater
Middle East necessitates new U.S. thinking and
policy toward Islam and the challenge of Is-
lamic activism. This new U.S. perspective must
take stock of the changing balance of power
between the Shi‘a and Sunnis in the greater
Middle East as well as the evolving relationship
among the United States, Wahhabism, and
Shi‘ism. For the past two decades, U.S. policy
has largely been shaped by a desire to contain
the challenge of Islamist politics to ruling secu-
lar regimes and, more recently, the goal of pro-
moting pluralism and democracy. The current imperative of containing Sunni
militancy, however, more than any other perceived imperative, should guide
the United States in striking the right balance between its policies in Iraq and
its larger interests in the region.
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